The Scandal of the Resurrection: Why Women Strengthen the Case for the Resurrection

If one has read books on apologetics or works presenting evidence for the resurrection, the claim that women being the first witnesses to the resurrection supports its historicity is likely familiar. Upon initially encountering this argument, its basic premise may be understood, though its strength as a line of evidence is not always immediately clear. Many readers likely share this initial reaction, which is why it is worthwhile to further examine the reasoning behind this point.

The first point to consider is that, in the historical context of the New Testament, women were generally not regarded as valid legal witnesses. This observation is frequently noted in modern apologetic literature. For example, William Lane Craig writes:

The appearance to the women disciples is independently attested by Matthew and John (Matt. 28:9-10; John 20:11-17) and enjoys, as well, ratification by the criterion of embarrassment, given the low credibility accorded to the testimony of women. It is generally agreed that the absence of this appearance from the list of appearances in the tradition quoted by Paul is a reflection of the same discomfort in citing female witnesses.¹⁾ William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Third Edition), Crossway Books (Wheaton, Il: 2008), p. 381

Craig is referencing methodological criteria developed by critical scholars to assess the historical reliability of the Gospel accounts. One such criterion is multiple attestation, which he applies to the appearances of the women as recorded in both Matthew and John. Another is the criterion of embarrassment, which holds that details likely to be embarrassing or counterproductive to the author’s agenda are less likely to be fabricated. In this context, the notion that women were the first witnesses to the resurrected Christ would have been culturally awkward in the ancient world, where female testimony held little credibility. Craig further suggests that this cultural discomfort may explain why Paul omits mention of the women in his summary of resurrection appearances in 1 Corinthians 15.

Ancient sources provide clear evidence of the cultural context in which women’s testimony was devalued. For instance, Josephus, in Antiquities of the Jews (Book 4, Chapter 8), states:

But let not a single witness be credited, but three, or two at the least, and those such whose testimony is confirmed by their good lives. But let not the testimony of women be admitted, on account of the levity and boldness of their sex Nor let servants be admitted to give testimony, on account of the ignobility of their soul; since it is probable that they may not speak truth, either out of hope of gain, or fear of punishment.²⁾ Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, 4.8.15 (4.219).

Similarly, the Gospel of Nicodemus (Chapter 7) affirms this societal attitude, recording the words of the Jewish authorities: “The Jews say: We have a law, that a woman’s evidence is not to be received.”³⁾ The Gospel of Nicodemus, chap. 7; The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Edited by Alexander Roberts, D.D., & James, Donaldson, LL.D., Hendrickson Publishers (Peabody, MA: 2012), Vol. 8, p. 419

The criterion of embarrassment is further supported by the second-century pagan critic Celsus, whose polemic against Christianity is preserved through quotations in Origen’s Against Celsus. Origen cites Celsus as ridiculing the Gospel accounts for reporting women as the first witnesses of the resurrection, referring to them as “half-frantic women.”⁴⁾ Origen, Against Celsus, bk. 2, chap. 59; The Anti-Nicene Fathers, Edited by Alexander Roberts, D.D., & James, Donaldson, LL.D., Hendrickson Publishers (Peabody, MA: 2012), Vol. 4, p. 455 Celsus dismissively refers to “certain women as ignorant as themselves.”⁵⁾ Origen, Against Celsus, bk. 3, chap. 55; The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Edited by Alexander Roberts, D.D., & James, Donaldson, LL.D., Hendrickson Publishers (Peabody, MA: 2012), Vol. 4, p. 486 Again, he mocks early Christian converts, describing them as “only foolish and low individuals, and persons devoid of perception, and slaves, and women, and children, of whom the teachers of the divine word wish to make converts.”⁶⁾ Origen, Against Celsus, bk. 3, chap. 49; The Ante-Nicene Fathers, Edited by Alexander Roberts, D.D., & James, Donaldson, LL.D., Hendrickson Publishers (Peabody, MA: 2012), Vol. 4, p. 484

Interestingly, the association of women with slaves and children as untrustworthy sources of testimony was common in the ancient world. In Jewish culture, the Mishnah frequently groups “women, slaves, and minors”⁷⁾ Mishna, Berakoth 3.3; 7.2; Pesahim 8.7; Shekalim 1.3, 5, 6; Sukkah 2.8; 3.10’ Hagigah 1.1; Menhoth 9.8; Parah 5.4; 12.10. All citations of The Mishnah are from Herbert Danby’s translation, Hendrickson Pub. (Peabody, MA: 1933, 2016). together, reflecting a shared legal and social status regarding their perceived reliability. In some cases, this list is expanded to include “a deaf-mute, imbecile, minor, blind man, gentile, slave, an agent, or a woman,”⁸⁾ Mishna, Menhoth 9.8 indicating a broader category of individuals deemed unfit to provide valid testimony. The rationale appears to be based on perceived physical, intellectual, or social deficiencies: for instance, a deaf-mute cannot hear or speak to offer testimony, a blind man cannot observe events, and an imbecile is presumed incapable of rational thought. Women, along with gentiles and minors, were similarly regarded as inherently unreliable witnesses within this legal framework.

Further evidence from the Mishnah underscores the legal limitations placed on women and others deemed unfit to provide testimony. For example, regarding a hermaphrodite, it states: “like women he is not eligible to give any testimony enjoined in the Law[.]”⁹⁾Mishna, Bikkurim 4.3 Similarly, the following individuals are listed as ineligible to testify: “These are they that are ineligible: a dice-player, a usurer, pigeon-flyers, traffickers in Seventh Year produce, and slaves. This is the general rule: any evidence that a women is not eligible to bring, these are not eligible to bring.”¹⁰⁾ Mishna, Rosh Ha-Shanah 1.8 This formulation establishes women as the baseline for legal ineligibility, equating their testimony with that of socially or morally suspect individuals.

Another passage from the Mishnah reads: “All may be deemed trustworthy when they testify to a woman [that her husband is dead] excepting her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her husband’s brother’s wife, and her husband’s daughter.”¹¹⁾ Mishna, Yebamoth 15.4, also see, 15.8-10 Notably, all those excluded from providing testimony in this case are women—mothers, daughters, and co-wives—further illustrating the general mistrust of female testimony in legal matters.

Understanding why women were considered unreliable as witnesses requires an appreciation of how they were viewed in the broader context of ancient society. While the focus here is on Jewish legal tradition due to its direct relevance to the Gospel narratives, it should be noted that Gentile cultures often held even lower views of women, frequently subjecting them to more severe social and legal restrictions.

The Mishnah reflects various attitudes toward women that were prevalent in ancient Jewish culture. For example, Avot 2:7 records the following sentiment: “the more women the more witchcraft; the more bondwomen the more lewdness”¹²⁾ Mishna, Aboth 12.7 Such statements highlight a common association of women with moral and spiritual vulnerability, or even danger.

Additional rabbinic rulings further illustrate this perception. One passage asserts:

A man must be saved alive sooner than a woman, and his lost property must be restored sooner than hers. A woman’s nakedness must be covered sooner than a man’s, and she must be brought out of captivity sooner than he. When both stand in danger of defilement, the man must be freed before the woman.¹³⁾ Mishna, Horayoth 3.7

This hierarchy of priorities reflects the underlying assumption of male precedence and female secondary status in matters of value, dignity, and ritual concern.

In a discussion regarding ritual impurity caused by the presence of a tax collector, the Mishnah states: “What do they render unclean? Foodstuff and liquids and open earthenware vessels; but couches and seats and earthenware vessels having a tightly stopped-up covering remain clean. If a gentile or a woman was with them all becomes unclean.”¹⁴⁾ Mishna, Tohoroth 7.6 The explanation for why the presence of a woman renders even sealed vessels impure is striking: “because women are gluttonous; for a woman is suspected of uncovering her neighbor’s cooking pot to know what she is cooking.”¹⁵⁾ Mishna, Tohoroth 7.9 This commentary reflects not only the ritual concerns of the time but also the stereotypes that informed judgments about women’s behavior and trustworthiness.

In Jewish culture, it was considered socially inappropriate—and often taboo—for a man to engage in extended conversation with a woman. The Mishnah reflects this sentiment in Abot 1:5, where it records:

Jose b. Johana of Jerusalem said: Let thy house be opened wide and let the needy by members of thy household; and talk not much with womankind. They said this of a man’s own wife: how much more of his fellow’s wife! Hence the Sages have said: He that talks much with womankind brings evil upon himself and neglects the study of the Law and at the last will inherit Gehenna.¹⁶⁾ Mishna, Aboth 1.5

It is worth noting that when the Mishnah records disputes or teachings among various rabbis, it often concludes by citing “the Sages,” whose opinions carry the authoritative weight of consensus within rabbinic tradition. Thus, this statement reflects not merely an individual opinion, but a broadly accepted social and religious norm regarding male interaction with women in the Jewish context of the time.

Another passage from the Mishnah underscores the strict gender-based boundaries of social interaction in Jewish culture: “A man may not remain alone with two women, but a woman may remain alone with two men. R. Simeon says: Even one man may remain alone with two women when his wife is with him…”¹⁷⁾ Mishna, Kiddushin 4.12 his reflects the broader societal concern for propriety and the perception of female vulnerability or susceptibility to moral compromise.

Additionally, the Mishnah outlines circumstances in which a woman forfeits her ketubah. The ketubah—literally “a written document”—functioned as a marital contract guaranteeing a specified sum to the wife in the event of divorce or the husband’s death. The text states: “These are they that are put away without their Ketubah: a wife that transgresses the Law of Moses and Jewish custom…. And what [conduct is such that transgresses] Jewish custom? If she goes out with her hair unbound, or spins in the street, or speaks with any man.”¹⁸⁾Mishna, Ketuboth 7.6

A later rabbinic text, Numbers Rabbah, states: “A man should not hold conversation with a woman in the market-place; not even with his wife, needless to say with any other woman, because of what people might say.”¹⁹⁾Numbers Rabbah, 10.8; in Midrash Rabbah, ed. H. Freedman and Maurice Simon), Soncino Press (New York, NY: 1983), Vol. 5, p. 376 his reflects the societal norms and concerns regarding propriety and reputation in ancient Jewish culture.

In summary, the view of women in ancient Judaism was shaped by a perception that they were unclean, gluttonous, gossipy, lewd, and potentially involved with magic. Given these prevailing attitudes, it is unsurprising that men were instructed not to engage in conversation with women in public spaces and that women’s testimonies were not accepted in courts.

The third point that requires discussion is when a woman’s testimony was accepted. While it is often argued that women’s testimonies were generally dismissed, there were occasions when their testimony was considered valid and even authoritative. This is a point frequently overlooked in discussions surrounding the embarrassment factor of women being the first witnesses of the resurrection.

Several examples from the Mishna illustrate situations where a woman’s testimony was accepted. For instance, it states: “So, too, with a swarm of bees: if the owner cherished no hope of recovering them, they may become the finder’s own. R. Johanan b. Baroka said: A woman or a child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here’.”²⁰⁾ Mishna, Bab Kamma 9.2 This scenario involves a honey farmer searching for a lost swarm of bees. The question is when the farmer should cease the search and allow the bees to become the property of another. If the original owner is informed by a woman or a child—again equating a female and a minor—about the bees’ departure, their testimony is to be trusted.

Another example from the Mishna states: “If a city was overcome by a besieging troop all women therein of priestly stock become ineligible [for marriage with a priest]; but if they had witnesses, even a bondman or a bondwoman, these may be believed.”²¹⁾ Mishna, Ketuboth 2.9 This passage addresses the scenario of a city being conquered, with the assumption that the women were defiled by the invading soldiers. As a result, they become ineligible for marriage to a priest, since priests were required to marry virgins according to Leviticus 21. However, if a bondman or bondwoman—either a male or female slave—can testify that the women were not defiled, their testimony is deemed valid. It is important to note that slaves, minors, and women were often grouped together in legal contexts. In this case, even a female slave is permitted to testify that a woman’s purity remained intact after the city’s invasion.

The following quotes address the eligibility of a woman to remarry after her husband’s death. However, it was required that there be an eyewitness to the deceased within three days of his death, before the body began to decay and become unrecognizable. In these circumstances, women, children, and slaves were considered valid witnesses to allow a woman to remarry.

The Mishna states:

And the rule was established to suffer a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness [who testifies what he has heard] from [another] witness, or from a slave or from a woman or from a bondwoman. R. Eliezer and R. Joshua say: They may not suffer a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness. R. Akiba says: Nor on the evidence of a woman or of them that are near of kin. The Sages answered: Once certain Levites went to Zoar, the City of Palms, and one of them fell sick by the way, and they brought him to an inn. When they returned thither, they asked the mistress of the inn, ‘Where is our companion?’ She answered, ‘He is dead and I buried him’. And they suffered his wife to marry again. The Sages said to R. Aiba, ‘And should not a priest’s wife be [deemed as trustworthy] as the mistress of an inn?’ He answered, ‘Only when the mistress of an inn could be deemed trustworthy! [For in this case] the mistress of the inn brought out to them his staff and his bag and the scroll of the Law that had belonged to him’.²²⁾ Mishna, Yebamoth 16.7

It is important to note that the mistress of the inn was regarded with a low reputation, often assumed to be a harlot, as exemplified by Rahab in the book of Joshua. This was the common view of women running inns. Yet, in this context, even a woman of low status, such as a prostitute, could be trusted to testify about a man’s death and burial, provided she could present tangible evidence, such as items that had belonged to the deceased. Jewish culture placed a significant emphasis on procreation, as God commanded humanity to “be fruitful and multiply.” Consequently, there was a degree of leniency regarding the remarriage of widows, recognizing the importance of fulfilling this command. Thus, permitting women, minors, and slaves to testify to a death was crucial in allowing widows to remarry and fulfill God’s mandate of procreation.

This point is reiterated multiple times in the Mishna. For example: “Even if a man [only] heard women saying, ‘such-a-one is dead’, that suffices. R. Judah says: Even if he [only] heard children saying, ‘We are going to bewail and bury such-a-one’, that suffices, whether or not he had an intention [to give evidence thereof].”²³⁾ Mishna, Yebamoth 16.5

This discussion becomes more intricate when questioning whether a married couple, after embarking on a long journey, can have the woman’s testimony accepted if she returns claiming to be a widow. The Mishna records:

If a woman and her husband went beyond the sea and there was peace between him and her and peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead’, she may marry again. [If she said,] ‘My husband died [childless]’, she may contract levirate marriage. If there was peace between him and her but war in the world, or contention between him and her but peace in the world, and she came back and said, ‘My husband is dead’, she may not be believed. R. Judah says: She may never be believed unless she returns weeping and with garments rent. The sages answered: It is all one [whether she does so or not]: she may not marry again.²⁴⁾ Mishna, Yebamoth 15.1

The major criterion for whether a witness—whether a slave, minor, or female—is to be accepted concerning the dead is whether an eyewitness saw the body within three days after death. David Kraemer explains this in his book The Meanings of Death in Rabbinic Judaism:

We have seen in the Bavli [that is the Babylonian Talmud] as in earlier rabbinic texts that the first three days following death were understood to have a special quality. This is the period during which the soul is believed to hover nearby the body, hoping to re-enter its former home. Only with the coming of the third day, when the physical signs of death first become undeniably apparent, does the soul give up hope and begin its journey of transition to the world of the dead.²⁵⁾ David Kraemer, The Meanings of Death in Rabbinic Judaism, Routledge (New York, NY: 2000), p. 123

It was common practice to revisit the tomb on the third day to anoint the body with oil and spices, which allowed for the opportunity to observe the beginning signs of decomposition. The Mishna refers to this practice, stating:

Evidence may not be given [of the identity of a corpse] save from [proof afforded by] the face together with the nose, even though there were [other] marks [of identity] on its body or its clothing. Evidence [of a man’s death] may be given only after his soul is gone forth, even though he was seen mortally wounded or crucified or being devoured by a wild beast. Evidence [of the identity of a corpse] may be given only during the first three days [after death]; but R. Judah b. Baba says: [Decay in corpses is] not alike in all men, in all places, and at all times.²⁶⁾ Mishna, Yebamoth 16.3

Judah acknowledges that decay is not uniform across all men, places, or times. This is a scientific fact. For instance, bodies are better preserved in the dry climate of Egypt or in cooler locations, such as deep caves or stone tombs. Weather conditions, as well as the body’s muscle and fat composition, also affect the rate of decomposition, as the fat in the body liquefies, accelerating the decay process.

Andrew Simmonds explains why women were considered better suited to identify dead bodies in ancient Jewish culture. He wrote:

There was a long history of woman’s testimony allowed for the identification of (actual or presumed) deceased loved ones (or persons believed to be dead but were alive), such as a child, or especially a husband, or other close (often male) friends or relations. Because of women’s greater physical intimacy with children and adults, including members of the opposite sex (than men usually have with each other), and their intimacy among other women and knowledge of ‘women’s matter,’ as wives, mothers, nannies, nurses, and caregivers, women were considered suited to identify certain close individuals.²⁷⁾ Andrew Simmonds, “Women Witnesses to the Risen Lord,” Verbum Vitae, 40/4 (2022), p. 917-918

From a modern perspective, this suggests that women’s emotional bonds, particularly in familial relationships, equipped them to notice and remember the distinctive physical features of those they knew. This emotional connection was critical to their ability to identify the deceased. While skeptics like Celsus dismissed women as “half-frantic,” and the apostles themselves initially gave little credence to their testimony of witnessing the risen Lord (Mark 16:11), it was precisely this emotional depth that allowed them to confidently recognize and identify the deceased. Though women were generally excluded from providing testimony in legal matters, their testimony regarding the identification of the dead was not only accepted as valid but often considered more authoritative. This helps explain why Jewish sources do not derogate women as the first witnesses of the resurrection. It also clarifies why Celsus, a pagan, mocked their testimony and why Paul did not mention the women witnesses in 1 Corinthians 15, addressing a Gentile church.