Michael Heiser Was Wrong—But Is Dempsey Any Better?

Psalm 82 and the “Divine Council”

As many readers may know, I am currently working on an expanded second edition of my book The Unbiblical Realm, which examines the theological claims of Michael Heiser. As part of this project, I have been reading as many substantive critiques of Heiser’s work as possible. One particularly noteworthy critique is Brian Dempsey’s The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, published by Everstone Press in 2026.

Dempsey’s work deserves consideration because, despite ultimately retaining the concept of a “divine council,” he offers several significant criticisms of Heiser’s interpretation of Psalm 82 and related passages. In this article, I will examine both the strengths and weaknesses of Dempsey’s argument.

Dempsey presents an awkward combination of positions. On the one hand, he accepts the existence of what he calls a “Divine Council.” On the other hand, he argues that Psalm 82 is primarily directed against human rulers. In this respect, Dempsey provides several useful critiques of Heiser. Yet his continued acceptance of the “divine council” concept creates an epistemological tension with the very arguments he uses to criticize Heiser.

Dempsey’s Critique of Heiser’s Interpretation of Psalm 82

Dempsey offers several strong arguments against Heiser’s theology. He correctly observes that Heiser’s conception of the Divine Council cannot be established from Psalm 82 because the Psalm contains no explicit connection to the Tower of Babel event.¹⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 81 Dempsey also correctly identifies a problem with Heiser’s treatment of the Hebrew term elohim, particularly when Heiser attempts to establish that elohim necessarily refers to divine beings. Scripture itself demonstrates that human beings can be described with the term elohim.²⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 94-96 For example, God tells Moses concerning Pharaoh, “See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh” (Exodus 7:1).

Dempsey further identifies theological problems with Heiser’s claim that God disinherited the nations and assigned them to lesser divine beings. Scripture repeatedly presents God as sovereign over the entire world.³⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 112-113, 125-126 Dempsey’s primary objection appears to concern the implications of Heiser’s understanding of the Divine Council—particularly the idea that the council participates in determining decrees and directing human history while God Himself remains sovereign over it.⁴⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 24-25

I have discussed this theological problem at greater length in my previous presentation, “Michael Heiser, Open Theism, and a Failing God.”⁵⁾Michael Hieser, Open Theism, and a Failing God” at https://youtu.be/qIr6zb3R_Z4; or read my article “Michael Heiser’s Open Theism Heresy,”Jan 26, 2026; https://truthwatchers.com/michael-heisers-open-theism-heresy/ The objections I raise there appear to overlap significantly with Dempsey’s concerns regarding Heiser’s theology.

The central argument Dempsey develops is that the injustice condemned in Psalm 82:2–4 is never attributed to a group of divine beings. Rather, the sins described are characteristic of human rulers. Dempsey writes:

“Yahweh never commands spiritual beings to enact legal justice in the human sphere, nor does He rebuke them for failing to defend orphans and the needy. These responsibilities are explicitly and repeatedly placed on human kings, judges, and rulers.”⁶⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026). p. 72.

Dempsey emphasizes this point to argue that there is no biblical warrant for interpreting the judgment against the elohim in Psalm 82 as a judgment against a celestial Divine Council. Instead, he extends the human-ruler interpretation from verse 2 through the remainder of the Psalm.

Dempsey identifies another significant theological tension in Heiser’s interpretation. He writes:

“If divine beings are held responsible for national injustice, then why is Yahweh never held accountable when Israel’s rulers become corrupt?”⁷⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 79-80.

This is an important question. Israelite rulers are repeatedly condemned throughout Scripture for precisely the kinds of sins described in Psalm 82. If God supposedly appointed lesser gods to rule over the Gentile nations and then held those divine beings responsible for the injustices committed within those nations, the distinction becomes difficult to maintain when Israel itself repeatedly experiences corrupt rulers who are judged by God.

Humans are consistently identified throughout Scripture as responsible for oppressing the poor, widows, and orphans. Consequently, there are essentially two possibilities within the framework under consideration. Either Psalm 82 is addressing human rulers, or, if Heiser’s Divine Council interpretation is retained, the gods of the nations must somehow be held responsible for the actions of the human populations they supposedly govern.

The latter interpretation creates a serious theological difficulty. Why would God judge lesser divine beings for injustices occurring among the nations while Israelite rulers are repeatedly condemned for committing the same kinds of injustices? If the same standard is not applied consistently, the Divine Council interpretation introduces an apparent double standard into the biblical text.

Dempsey accurately summarizes another important point:

“There is no indication that Yahweh assigned divine beings the responsibility of enforcing righteousness among the nations.”⁸⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026). p. 81.

This is a sound assessment of the biblical evidence. For this and other reasons, Dempsey correctly interprets the elohim in Psalm 82:6 as human rulers.

Psalm 82:6–7 and the Meaning of “Like Men”

Dempsey also challenges Heiser’s interpretation of Psalm 82:6–7. He explains:

   The phrase “like men” (k’adam) does not signal a transformation from immortality to mortality, as some argue. Instead, it underscores that these rulers, though exalted, are still mere men, subject to Yahweh’s supreme authority and ultimate judgment….

   The phrase “fall like any prince” reinforces this point. Their position does not exempt them from judgment. However high they were elevated, they would suffer the same fate as any earthly ruler who abandoned justice.⁹⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 103.

Anyone familiar with Heiser’s work will recognize the significance of these verses. Heiser has repeatedly argued that the phrase “like men” establishes a contrast between human beings and divine beings. According to this interpretation, the elohim must be divine beings because they are said to die “like men.”

Psalm 82:6–7 states:

“I have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most High. But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes.” (Psalm 82:6–7)

However, as I have argued in previous critiques, this interpretation fails to account adequately for the Hebrew construction. The expression translated “like men” is כְּאָדָם (kəʾādām), consisting of the noun ʾādām (“man” or “men”) prefixed by the preposition כְּ (kə).

Contrary to Heiser’s argument, this construction does not inherently establish a contrast between humanity and deity. The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon describes this use of the preposition as follows:

“to compare an object with the class to which it belongs, and express its correspondence with the idea which it ought to realize.”¹⁰⁾Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, C.A. Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1980). p. 454.

The significance of this observation is considerable. The comparison is not necessarily between two different classes—gods on one side and humans on the other. Rather, the statement can be understood as emphasizing similarity within the same category: these rulers will die “like men” because they are themselves mortal men.

Consequently, Psalm 82:6–7 is better understood as employing parallelism rather than the antithetical parallelism required by Heiser’s interpretation. The terms “gods” (elohim) and “children of the most High” (bene elyon) identify the same subjects who are subsequently described as men and princes.

Dempsey is therefore correct to challenge Heiser’s interpretation of these verses. Psalm 82:6–7 provides no compelling linguistic basis for transforming the elohim into immortal divine beings.

The Problem with Dempsey’s “Divine Council”

Dempsey presses these arguments strongly in his attempt to demonstrate that Scripture does not support Heiser’s Deuteronomy 32 worldview. However, this is precisely where Dempsey’s own interpretation becomes problematic. Although he rejects Heiser’s understanding of Psalm 82, he nevertheless assumes that Psalm 82:1 refers to a Divine Council.

Dempsey writes:

“The Hebrew word עֲדַת (Adath, “assembly” or “congregation”) can refer to human gatherings (e.g., Exodus 12:3), but when paired with El (אל, God), it consistently refers to a celestial assembly. This phrase appears in passages that clearly describe heavenly beings assembled before Yahweh. For example, Psalm 89 references the assembly (עדת) of the holy ones and emphasizes that no one in the skies can be compared to Yahweh or the sons of God.”¹¹⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 66-67.

This argument resembles one frequently made by Heiser: Psalm 82 should be interpreted through comparison with Psalm 89, where a heavenly assembly is clearly present.

The problem is that Psalm 82 itself contains no explicit reference to a heavenly council. The Psalm describes injustice, judgment, rulers, the poor, the fatherless, and the oppressed. The immediate context is concerned with the administration of justice rather than with a heavenly council.

More importantly, Dempsey’s statement concerning Psalm 89 contains a significant factual problem. The Hebrew word עֲדַת (ʿadat) does not occur in Psalm 89. Thus, the statement that “Psalm 89 references the assembly (עדת)” is incorrect.

Psalm 89 does contain language concerning an assembly of holy ones, but the specific Hebrew word עֲדַת is not used there. Consequently, Dempsey’s argument cannot be established by claiming that Psalm 89 uses the same term found in Psalm 82:1.

There is an even greater problem. Dempsey refers specifically to the phrase Adath El and argues that it occurs in connection with Psalm 89. Yet the two Hebrew words עֲדַת (adath) and אֵל (El) are not paired together elsewhere in Scripture outside Psalm 82:1.

Therefore, Dempsey’s statement does more than simply suggest that adath occurs in Psalm 89. He presents Psalm 89 as an example of the same terminology being used for a heavenly assembly. But the Hebrew terminology he identifies is not actually present in Psalm 89.

These kinds of statements raise questions about the degree to which Dempsey is engaging the Hebrew text directly. The problem is especially significant because his argument depends upon a supposed lexical connection between Psalm 82 and Psalm 89.

Psalm 82:1 and the Object of Judgment

Dempsey understands Psalm 82:1 as presenting a courtroom scene in which the Divine Council functions passively as witnesses to God’s decree against corrupt human rulers. According to this interpretation, the courtroom is located in heaven, in the midst of the elohim, while the actual recipients of God’s judgment are human rulers on earth.

Dempsey argues that the elohim in verse 1 are not themselves the objects of God’s judgment. He writes:

“It is important to recognize that this verse does not specify the object of Yahweh’s judgment but only establishes the setting where His judgment takes place. The Hebrew lacks a direct object marker for “judges” (ישְׁפֹּט, yishpot), meaning the verse states that Yahweh is engaged in an act of judgment, not necessarily who is being judged.”¹²⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 64-65.

Dempsey’s point is that Psalm 82:1 describes an act of judgment without explicitly identifying its object within the grammar of that particular clause. However, the larger context does identify the subjects being judged.

Psalm 82:1 states:

“God standeth in the congregation of the mighty; he judgeth among the gods.” (Psalm 82:1)

The verse itself does not state that this scene takes place in heaven. Dempsey arrives at that conclusion primarily by connecting the Psalm to his interpretation of Psalm 89. But that constitutes an assumption brought to the text rather than something explicitly stated by Psalm 82.

Furthermore, it is problematic to isolate verse 1 from the remainder of the Psalm. The context supplies the identity of those being judged. The subsequent verses describe the conduct of the elohim, followed by their condemnation and eventual fall. The literary structure of the Psalm reinforces this conclusion.

The Chiastic Structure of Psalm 82

The structure of Psalm 82 can be represented as follows:

A. God stands—judges the gods (v. 1)

B. The gods judge unjustly with partiality (v. 2)

C. Proper judgment is described (vv. 3–4)

B′. The gods have no understanding and are in darkness (v. 5)

A′. The gods fall—God judges (vv. 6–8)

In this literary structure, A and A′ correspond to one another. At the beginning of the Psalm, God stands while the elohim are judged; at the conclusion, the elohim fall while God executes judgment.

Likewise, B and B′ correspond to one another. The elohim are condemned because they judge unjustly, while verse 5 explains that they lack understanding and walk in darkness.

The central section, C, functions as the theological and didactic center of the Psalm. Verses 3–4 describe what righteous judgment should look like:

“Defend the poor and fatherless: do justice to the afflicted and needy. Deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked.” (Psalm 82:3–4)

The Psalm then reaches its conclusion with the pronouncement:

“I have said, Ye are gods; and all of you are children of the most High. But ye shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes.” (Psalm 82:6–7)

The important point is that the elohim of verse 1 are naturally identified with the elohim of verse 6. The Psalm begins with God judging the elohim and concludes by announcing their judgment.

Dempsey’s interpretation disrupts this literary coherence. If the elohim of verse 1 are celestial beings functioning merely as passive observers, while the elohim of verse 6 are human rulers, the Psalm employs the same term for two different groups within the immediate context without clearly signaling such a change.

This creates an equivocation problem. If elohim means one thing in verse 1 and something fundamentally different in verse 6, the reader is forced to introduce a distinction that the Psalm itself does not clearly make.

Moreover, Dempsey’s interpretation raises a more basic question: if the Divine Council is merely observing God’s judgment of human rulers, why is the council mentioned at all? Its presence becomes largely inconsequential to the argument of the Psalm.

By contrast, if the elohim in verse 1 are themselves the recipients of God’s judgment, their presence is essential to the Psalm’s argument. The natural progression is then straightforward: God stands among the elohim, condemns their unjust judgment, instructs them concerning proper justice, declares that they have failed, and finally pronounces their judgment.

The Problem of Undefined Terminology

Another recurring problem in Dempsey’s book is his failure to provide sufficiently precise definitions for the terminology he repeatedly employs. He frequently describes the biblical Divine Council as consisting of “divine beings,”¹³⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 18, 24, 28, 37, 42, 43, 48, 53, 64. “divine attendants,”¹⁴⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 20. “divine messengers,”¹⁵⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 21. “divine agents,”¹⁶⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 29. and “gods.”¹⁷⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), pp. 49, 53.

Yet he does not appear to provide a clear definition of what he means by “divine” or “gods.”

This is not a trivial terminological issue. Definitions are essential when discussing theological categories. If “gods” is being used in its ordinary English sense, then a group consisting of multiple gods constitutes a polytheistic model.

Dempsey nevertheless argues that his understanding of the Divine Council differs fundamentally from polytheistic models. He writes that his view:

“contrast sharply with the polytheistic models of Israel’s neighbors, in which divine councils functioned as cooperative ruling bodies.”¹⁸⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 42.

This raises an obvious question: in what sense does a system involving multiple gods cease to be polytheistic?

Dempsey does present Jehovah as sovereign over the lesser gods, but such a model would traditionally be classified as henotheistic—a particular form within the broader category of polytheism. If Dempsey does not intend “gods” and “divine” in their ordinary semantic sense, then he needs to define those terms clearly.

The best indication of what he may mean appears to associate “divine” with “ontological immortality.”¹⁹⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 104. If that is his intended definition, then the terminology should be stated explicitly rather than left for the reader to infer.

Is It Actually a “Divine Council”?

Dempsey’s primary emphasis is that pagan religions outside Israel often depicted councils of gods functioning as co-rulers, whereas the biblical model, according to his interpretation, depicts Yahweh as sovereign over the assembly.

In Dempsey’s reconstruction, the members of the biblical council are not advisers who determine God’s decisions. Rather, they are administrators who carry out decrees that God Himself has already established.

There are two significant problems with this thesis.

First, words have meanings. The expression “divine council” carries a recognizable semantic meaning. “Divine” ordinarily refers to deity or gods, while a “council” ordinarily refers to an assembly of individuals who deliberate or provide counsel.

I have encountered a similar terminological problem in correspondence with Christopher Kou, who advocated the existence of an angelic council. An angelic assembly is not inherently problematic from a Christian theological perspective. Angels are creatures of God, not rival deities. However, calling such an assembly a “divine council” introduces unnecessary confusion because angels and gods are categorically different concepts.²⁰⁾Heath Henning, “Evaluating the Divine Council Theology of Michael Heiser and Christopher Kou’s Adaptations,” Nov. 6, 2025; https://theopolisinstitute.com/conversations/evaluating-the-divine-council-theology-of-michael-heiser-and-christopher-kous-adaptations/

If the intended meaning is an angelic assembly, then “angelic assembly” would be a much more precise designation. If the group consists of gods, then “divine council” accurately communicates the polytheistic concept associated with the term.

The same problem applies to Dempsey’s use of the word “council.” If the members do not provide counsel or participate in deliberation, then it becomes difficult to understand why the term “council” is being retained.

Thus, Dempsey’s terminology leaves the reader with three unresolved questions: What does he mean by “divine”? What does he mean by “gods”? And in what sense is an assembly that does not provide counsel actually a “council”?

If what Dempsey means is an angelic assembly that serves God and carries out His commands, I would have little objection to the basic concept. Scripture clearly describes heavenly beings worshiping, praising, and serving God. But calling such an assembly a “divine council” communicates something substantially different.

Words matter, particularly when they are being used to construct a theological system.

The Ancient Near Eastern Comparison

Dempsey’s second major argument is that his conception of the biblical Divine Council differs fundamentally from the divine councils found in the Ancient Near East because Yahweh remains absolutely sovereign.

He writes:

“The high god was often expected to act following the council’s decision rather than issuing commands independently, meaning divine rule was distributed rather than absolute….

This is where the biblical depiction fundamentally departs from the ANE model. Unlike the divine assemblies of Ugarit, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, Yahweh does not rule by consensus.”²¹⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 18.

This claim is questionable, particularly because Dempsey’s interaction with primary Ancient Near Eastern sources appears relatively limited. In The Unseen Throne, he quotes the Code of Hammurabi once and the Keret Epic twice. His treatment of the Keret Epic is especially significant because the text itself appears to undermine the distinction he attempts to establish between the biblical conception of divine authority and the Ancient Near Eastern model.

In the Keret Epic, the high god El requests that individual members of the divine assembly heal King Keret. None of them is willing to do so, and El ultimately heals Keret himself.²²⁾Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (ed. James B. Pritchard) 3rd Edition, Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ: 1969), pp. 148-149

The significance of this episode is that El does not simply submit himself to the decision of the council. Instead, when the other divine beings fail to act, El acts independently and sovereignly.

This creates a serious problem for Dempsey’s central distinction. His argument depends upon contrasting the biblical Divine Council with Ancient Near Eastern divine councils by claiming that the biblical God alone exercises absolute authority over His council, while the pagan high gods operate according to the decisions of the council.

Yet the Keret Epic provides an example in which the high god acts independently rather than being constrained by the decision of the other divine beings.

Consequently, the distinction Dempsey seeks to establish is not as clear as he suggests. The Ancient Near Eastern material does not necessarily support a simple dichotomy between a sovereign biblical God and supposedly non-sovereign pagan high gods.

“A Biblical Theology of the Divine Council”

Dempsey also writes:

“A biblical theology of the divine council must derive from Scripture, not external reconstructions of presuppositions imposed on the text.”²³⁾Brian A. Dempsey, The Unseen Throne: Psalm 82 and the Divine Council: A Biblical-Theological Examination, Everstone Press (2026), p. 162.

The irony of this statement is that the expression “divine council,” as ordinarily understood, carries a conceptual framework strongly associated with the Ancient Near Eastern world. A divine council is, by definition, an assembly of divine beings or gods who deliberate and provide counsel to a high god.

Consequently, importing the terminology into biblical interpretation requires considerable care. One cannot simply insist that the Bible contains a “Divine Council” while simultaneously redefining “divine” and “council” so that the resulting concept bears little resemblance to the ordinary meaning of either term.

More importantly, Scripture itself explicitly denies the existence of anyone who can provide counsel to God on an equal or necessary basis.

Isaiah asks:

“Who hath directed the Spirit of the LORD, or being his counsellor hath taught him? With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding?” (Isaiah 40:13-14)

The New Testament likewise declares:

“For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?” (Romans 11:34)

The biblical testimony is therefore clear: God does not require counsel from other beings.

The same problem arises when considering the biblical teaching concerning other gods. Scripture repeatedly emphasizes monotheistic expressions of the God of Israel:

“See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me.” (Deuteronomy 32:39)

“For thus saith the LORD that created the heavens; God himself that formed the earth and made it; he hath established it, he created it not in vain, he formed it to be inhabited: I am the LORD; and there is none else.” (Isaiah 45:18)

These passages create a fundamental theological problem for the terminology of “Divine Council.” If God has no counsellor who instructs or advises Him, and if there are no other gods beside Him, then the biblical concept of a council of gods providing counsel to the supreme God cannot be sustained.

Conclusion

Dempsey succeeds in demonstrating that Michael Heiser’s interpretation of Psalm 82 is seriously flawed. Unfortunately, by retaining Heiser’s underlying Divine Council framework, he does not fully escape the conceptual problems that framework creates. In attempting to correct Heiser, Dempsey removes several pieces from Heiser’s system but retains the foundational category that generated many of the problems in the first place.